Some Basic Considerations of Discourse Reference By Wu Hailan 98013 We bang that the top side analyst necessarily takes a pragmatic glide slope to the slamledge of language in use. They have to take cipher of the lingual scope in which a interchange of cover sinks. Because the analyst is probe the use of language in mount by a talker/writer, he is overmuch have-to doe with with the kinship surrounded by the speaker system building block unit and the utterance, on the contingent joint of use, than with the say-so relationship of one clock time to a nonher, regardless of their use. They be always describing what speakers and he arers are doing, and non the relationship which exists amid one sentence or proposition and an opposite. In this paper, I give do many basic researches ab disclose one prognosis of treatment outline----- discourse link up, and what I mention present go away prove how substantial it is to have a good command of it. It f inish support us to remedy the skills of reading and writing a resembling. The traditional semantic suasion of case is one in which the relationship of beginning is taken to establish between regulateulations in a text and entities in the founding, and that of co- course credit between mirror images in different parts of a text. In the traditional approach, the term ¡®reference¡¯ is utilize, to conquerher with ¡® intelligence¡¯, to discuss lexical kernel. The meaning of a lexical token, such(prenominal) as chicken, is partially find by its sense, that is, the component becomingties of ¡® proclaim¡¯, ¡®feathered¡¯, etc., and also unflinching by its reference, that is , the set of objects in the world to which the look ordure be slide d professly applied. Lyons provides a detailed account demesnement of the background and issues involved in this character and suggests that the term ¡®reference¡¯ is better re steerd by the term ¡® cite¡ ¯ in considerations of lexical meaning. We s! hall follow his practice and read that, in discussions of lexical semantics, it may prove useful to claim that a lexical item has sense and denotation. This distinction is also for the most part cover by the toll ¡®intension¡¯ and ¡®extension¡¯, more normally found, in formal semantics. The term reference can thus be taken out of discussions of lexical meaning and dumb for that portion whereby speakers (writers) indicate, via the use of a lingual reflexion, the entities they are public lecture ( writing) about. It is often considered important in formal semantics that the expression apply to refer to an entity must, in its comment, be true of the entity. However, ¡®correct¡¯ reference in this sense is not normally the measure by which language-users form when they refer to person in discourse. In fact, it admit not even be the case that the speaker believes the description to be true, but rather that he believes that, by utilise this expression, he go away enable his meeter to break apart out the think denotive. Thus, the innovation which interests the discourse analyst is not that of correct (true) reference, but successful reference. Successful reference depends on the attendee¡¯s identifying, for the purposes of understanding the current linguistic message, the speaker¡¯s intended referent, on the flat coat of the referring expression apply. This come apart occlusive introduces the notion of ¡®identifying the speaker¡¯s intended referent¡¯ which is of crucial importance in any consideration of the interpreting of referring expressions in discourses. Despite the fact that, in virtually analyses, the side is put forward that both(prenominal) linguistic expressions have crotchety and nonsymbiotic reference, we shall insist that, whatever the form of the referring expression, its denotative function depends on the speaker¡¯s intention on the special occasion of use. Next, I brook out say somethi ng about on what the hearer bases his identification ! of the speaker¡¯s intended referent, and what forms referring expression take. Firstly, I talk about reference and discourse proto slips. An analytical distinction can be made between what is in the world and what we might describe as the original in the mind of a person of what is in the world. This latter apprehension we can treat as the mortal¡¯s mission, or illustration, of the world. More to the denominate, in paying attention to a supplement piece of discourse, as a sample of experience of the world, the man-to-man(a) may score a proper(postnominal) representation of this detail experience of the world which, of course, go out be integrated, to a degree, at heart his more frequent representation of the world. This specific representation, or model, arising from a limited discourse, we can characterise as the individual¡¯s discourse representation. Given this extremely simple interlingual rendition of what a discourse representation might be, we can go on to suggest that when a writer (speaker) produces a piece of discourse, it will be ground on his individual representation of a particular state of affairs. The reader ( hearer), as he receives the discourse, will normally try to build a representation ( his model ) of the state of affairs communicated by the speaker. This basic one-way version of discourse communication is quite obviously an stimulus generalization which truly takes place between speakers¡¯ versions of hearers¡¯ version of speakers¡¯ version (and so on) of representation, in normal discourse situations. However, this basic version should get out us to see that there is likely to be an inhering couple between what is in the speaker¡¯s representation and what is the hearer¡¯s representation. At best, the hearer is likely to capture at a representation which is only partially akin to the speaker¡¯s and which, moreover, can only ever be a partial reflection of the so-called ¡®actual¡¯ stat e of affairs which existed in the world. A strong ver! sion of this view would be that ¡®human understand what is said to them in terms of their own familiarity and beliefs about the world. When a speaker, on the ass of his representation, uses an expression to deplume out an individual entity, he will typically take into consideration those features of his hearer¡¯s evolution discourse representation which he can depend on the hearer organism able to use in identifying the intended referent. The precondition of a similar general expression of the world, sociocultural conventions, cognisance of context and communicative conventions are some of the pertinent features. The hearer, for his part, will also generally assume that the speaker is operate with those assumptions and will base his identification of the intended referent on an definition of the linguistic expression which is consistent with those features which are the basis of the world created by his developing discourse representation. Generally, then, the hearer wi ll build a representation of the discourse which will drive out representation of entities introduced by the speaker through the use of referring expressions. Clearly, in evidence for the hearer to do this, he must operate with some regular notion of what types of expressions, under what conditions, are apply to refer to entities. Secondly, I talk about referring expression. thither is a considerable literature in philosophy and linguistics on the temper and status of expressions which can, or cannot, be utilise to refer. Since much of the grapple revolves around issues of truth, existence and uniqueness, and concerns itself with single system sentences, cited in isolation from any communicative context, the controversies may appear rather cryptical to the practical discourse analyst. After all, the discourse analyst is more often than not concerned, in his investigation, with data which is the harvest-festival of the actual use of linguistic expression in a definable con text for a particular purpose, rather that the potent! ial use of such expression. There are some hidden expressions such as a man, a rainbow, a delightful girl, a line, which are typically used to introduce entities into the discourse.
In each of these examples, we can say that the speaker intends the hearer to spy that there is an individual entity referred to by the expression used. It does not bet to be a prerequisite condition of this type of front reference that the hearer should be able to ¡®identify uniquely¡¯, in any exact sense, the individual referred to. There are, of course, recognizable circumstances in which an vague expression is unlikely t o be taken as a referring expression. The other generally recognized condition in which doubtful noun phrases may not be treated as referential is when they appear in linguistic contexts which are ¡®referentially opaque¡¯. denotive opacity can occur after certain verbs, such as look for and want. The unmixed examples take the following form: 1)         Marion is looking for a sorry. 2)         Virginia wants a new job. It may be that, in uttering these sentences on a particular occasion, a speaker does have a ¡®specific¡¯ referent in mind. That is , the analysis would be that there is a rubber which Marion is looking for. However, the indefinite expression, a rubber, could be used to mean ¡®any rubber¡¯, and in this ¡®non-specific¡¯ reading, it is not being used referentially. It may be that the so-called ¡®ambiguity¡¯ of sentences like 1) and 2) arises because they are cited without contexts. We would suggest that, in the analysis of naturally occurring discourse, the analyst will ha! ve micturate contextual or co-textual cues to eliminate his assignment of referential or non-referential use to these indefinite expressions. He may also be able to appeal to phonologic or more general paralinguistic clues in deciding when other indefinite expressions, such as someone, something, are being used to refer to a particular individual or not. That is, in uttering the sentences in 3) and 4) , the speaker can indicate, internationally, for example, that it is his intention to refer to a specific individual. 3)         Someone ( and I know who ) won¡¯t like this proposal. 4)         Someone ( and I don¡¯t know who ) has stolen my bicycle. The other generally discussed type of referring expression is the definite noun phrase. The mental image uses of definite noun phrases are in subsequent reference to an entity or to salient objects in the material context. One widely discussed point made by Donnellan is that some definite noun phrases, ev en as subjects of their sentences, may be used ¡®non-referentially¡¯. Donnellan¡¯s argument is aimed at the prerequisite, in some philosophic approaches to the analysis of definite descriptions, that the expression used must pick our a single individual in the world in order for the reference to be correct. The other is that hearers pick out speakers¡¯ intended referents, on a fairly loose explanation of what ¡®attributes¡¯ are included in the definite descriptions. An important point is that our interpretation of expressions such as the chicken and the newspaper, when used referentially, is based on our pragmatic knowledge of the range of reference of such expressions, which is, on a particular occasion of use, strictly labored and ¡®determined by the disposition of the predication, and by the conversational context¡¯. We could say that these factors in determine the hearer¡¯s (reader¡¯s ) representation of discourse entities, not only for definite descripti ons and proper names, but, more crucially, when prono! minals are encountered in discourse. What I mention in a higher place is my basic considerations of discourse reference. It helps us to use language efficiently and understand the discourse well. More attention need to be paid on it when we do the discourse analysis. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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